a quote by Epicurus

The Deprivation Process

The Epicurean argument I will defend suggests that being dead is not to be feared because being dead is a state or condition that is not experienced by the person who dies. It is not rational to fear something “I” won’t experience. This seems to me, a logical reason not to fear the condition of being dead and from this it seems to follow that if “I” am not going to experience being dead then what reason do I have to fear death? And if I don’t fear death then is death all that bad? A popular response is that death is bad because it necessarily deprives the person who dies of the goods of life. I’m going to suggest that death is not bad because it is a necessary contingent of life. I will speak of deprivation as a process that occurs as one lives and that death is just the end of that process. I will use Plato’s argument of opposites to support my idea that death and life are necessary contingents of one another and from this I will draw forth the notion that every moment I live is one less moment of my total life and therefore one moment closer to my impending death. To do this I will follow Feldman’s example of using a Hedonistic framework of values and use a similar method to illustrate that dying is a process that is experienced in union with living and that the very act of living requires a deprivation of moments of life (and that is not a bad).

Defending Epicurus

Epicurus’ argument offers an opportunity to escape the emotional turmoil that comes with the mysteriousness of death by stating that death is neither good nor bad. Epicurus states that death is neither good nor bad because it is not experienced by the person who is dead because that person is dead and unable to evaluate the experience of being dead. The argument is found in Epicurus’ Letter To Menoeceus: “So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist”. It seems quite reasonable, given that little is known about what actually happens in the post-death condition, to accept this argument on the grounds that it makes linguistic sense. To further support this idea I will turn to Jay Rosenberg’s "Thinking Clearly About Death" in which he stresses the difference between linguistic appearance and linguistic reality.

Rosenberg makes it very clear in the first chapter of his book that there are important distinctions to make regarding the language we use when we speak of death. It is important to clearly understand these differences so as to not interchange words of different meaning which result in the misuse of language (Rosenberg p. 39). Being ‘dead’ implies a state or condition one is in - being dead is being something. Death on the other hand seems to me to describe a moment in time, one that can be referred to. To be able to refer to something suggests that it has or will happen. The death of something suggests a past event, whereas ‘my future death’ suggests some instance in time in the future. Dying, lastly, suggest a process that occurs over duration of time. The importance of using words like living and dying will be used to speak of the process of deprivation.

Epicurus does not seem to make a distinction between ‘dead’ and ‘death’ and so I have must take the two words to mean the same thing but I still see reason to accept his argument on the basis of the linguistic reality that Rosenberg speaks of. That anyone survives death is a contradiction of terms (Rosenberg p.33). Death is the moment where life ends and being dead begins. That anyone exists while being dead does not make linguistic or rational sense.

That “I” do not exist past the moment of death can also be supported through Rosenberg’s analysis that death brings about a change in the kind of condition in the person who has died (Rosenberg p. 37). On the account of a living person as a union of body and soul, at the moment of death this condition is ‘changed’. The body and soul no longer exist as a unit, ending the history of the body/soul composite of the person, to begin a new history as corpse and bodiless soul (Rosenberg p. 52). I agree that the body exists to function in a dualistic sense and that at the moment death occurs, this union is split and thus the person ceases to exist. Trying to critically understand what might happen, or not happen, at the moment of death will provide some insight into the condition of life and the process of deprivation I am going to suggest.

There is an opposing argument regarding the badness of death made by Thomas Nagel in "Mortal Questions" in the chapter “Death” that states that death is bad. This argument has to suggest then that life is intrinsically good. Plato, on the other hand, states that neither life, nor death, is intrinsically good or bad because the one exists in reaction to its opposite. Further on in this paper I will explain Plato’s Argument of Opposites which states that life is a necessary component or contingent of death. By siding with Plato I have given up the notion that death may be intrinsically bad for if it were it would have to follow that life is intrinsically good. It would be a contradiction to say that one state of being (death) has intrinsic worth, badness, when the other state of being (life) does not. I am not ready to commit to the idea that life is intrinsically good and so I have not sided with Nagel although it is important to consider the implications of various arguments in the analysis of one’s thoughts regarding the question of the badness of death.

Death is neither good nor bad because it is necessary of life

Plato argues for the existence of opposite forms in the Phaedo. He states that opposites exist in their absolute form necessarily from the existence of their opposite (Plato p. 20). Plato claims this circular argument regarding the absolute form of life and the absolute form of death. According to Plato’s circular argument, death exists as an absolute form opposite of its antecedent, life. It must be then that life exists as an absolute form opposite of its consequent, death. Plato states that life retreats in the presence of death and that death flees or retreats as life approaches. I will look at this relationship between opposites when I explain to process of deprivation and whether or not death is bad.

Plato also argues for that the absolutes exist as simple things, in the sense that they are unchanging. This is referred to as Theory of Forms (Plato p, 29). Dead, for example, is an absolute, a simple thing, a thing that is unchanging. Dead is not dying, for this requires a physical process, and death seems to me a moment in time. As with Epicurus, I do not think that Plato makes important linguistic differences regarding death, being dead and dying. I support Plato’s Theory of Forms and Argument from Opposites and I use this to defend my case that life is neither good nor bad because it just is necessary of death and I think the same applies to death. Death, as told by Plato, is not bad either for it exists necessarily from life. But what I find interesting is that neither Epicurus nor Plato makes the distinction between the process of dying and the moment of death. My argument states an awareness of the process of dying (and living) as simultaneous to one another. I will get to this shortly.

Regarding the Deprivation of life

Typically speaking, when something deprives us of some good we tend to say that this occurrence is bad. I suggest the possibility that even though death deprives the living of a continued existence, it is not to be feared because it is a necessary contingent of life. It may be the case, that something which is a necessary contingent is neither good nor bad, on the grounds that it is a necessary result of its opposite. In this sense, it may be the case that we, as rational beings who tend to place value on almost all things, are not, in this case, granted the privileged position of attaching specific value on this one thing, death, on the basis that it is a necessary moment in time. I look at the difficulty of determining when the process of dying actually begins in order to further support the theory that death is just a necessary contingent of life.

Although death deprives me of the experience of a longer experience of life, it is not bad. Death is a necessary moment in time, one that we, as mortal human beings, have to experience. I consider being dead an absolute as meant by Plato and according to Plato an absolute comes from its necessary opposite. Death is a necessary opposite of life. I am suggesting that a necessary experience cannot be bad because it is necessary and not subjected to the opinion of good or bad.

Is it clear when living ends and dying begins?

With each breath I take, I have taken one less breath of my life. Not knowing when death will occur, only that it occurs, leaves a possibility that I have just taken my last breath. Perhaps this chandelier falls on my head and kills me. Should this happen, these last few breaths, as I’ve been typing will be considered as my last breaths. Am I to say that I am dying, even though I am still living and typing because the chandelier has yet to fall? I don’t feel as though I am dying but if my next moment is my last then perhaps I am dying. Regardless of whether or not the chandelier falls on my head and kills me is not the point. The point I want to make is regardless of whether or not I know the exact moment when my death will occur, as few of us do know this, I still move closer towards my death with the passing of each moment. I understand the process of living and dying to be synomonous with one another, which is why I described suggested Plato’s Argument from Opposites before getting to this point. Simply put, with each breath comes a moment in life which equals, simultaneously, one less moment and breath of life, which equals, one moment close to death. When death will occur is not an issue for we all know that it is imminent. I to describe this in a Hedonistic framework of value as Feldman did in his article Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death (Feldman p. 228-229). I will try this experiment in point form:

That living ends and dying begins in the same moment has led me to consider that of the deprivation of the goods of life does not occur only at the moment of death. I think that deprivation may be a process that occurs over the duration of our existence. I am suggesting that deprivation occurs with each breath, for with each breath I take, I have lost a moment in time and this seems to me a great loss; one that inspires me to place value on the opportunities being alive provides me. To say that the moment of death deprives us of life may be inaccurate according to my theory. It may be more accurate to say that the deprivation of the good of life (meaning the experience of living) is not marked with death, it only ends at death. Death does not necessarily deprive the one who dies of the goods of life; it only marks the end of the deprivation process.

I have brought attention to the difficulty of determining when the process of dying actually begins because I believe that by understanding that living and dying happen simultaneously we can see deprivation as a process. What I have proposed is that although death takes from us the experience of a continued life, it is not bad, only necessary of life, and does not need to be feared. I have presented this argument on the suggestion that because life is neither intrinsically good nor bad then death is neither good nor bad, necessarily. I have summarized the main points of my argument as follows:

Conclusion

I have chosen to side with the Epicurean argument that suggests that being dead is not something to be feared because it is a state of being or condition that is not experienced by the person who fears it. It is not rational to fear something “I” won’t experience. This seems to me, a logical reason to not fear the condition of being dead. It follows that if “I”, referring to myself as I exist as living, am not going to experience being dead then what reason do I have to fear death? I have taken a stance that is slightly contrary to the common consideration that life is intrinsically good and that death deprives the person who has died of the goods of life. I have suggested that death is not bad because it does not deprive the living of the goods of life on the grounds that deprivation is a necessary consequence of living and that we must speak of deprivation when we speak of life. I have considered deprivation as a process that occurs as one lives and that death is just the end of that process. Plato’s Argument of Opposites support my idea that death and life are necessary contingents of one another and I attempted to construct a Hedonistic Framework of Values to illustrate this; that each moment I live is one less moment of my total life and therefore one moment closer to my impending death. I have concluded that dying is a process that is experienced in union with life and that the very state of living requires a deprivation of moments of life. This deprivation occurs over the duration of one’s life and death marks the end of this process.