Philosophy: Interpretations

Interpreting David Hume's Theory Of Personal Identity

David Hume’s Theory of Personal Identity, as it is presented in Book 1 of “A Treatise of Human Nature”, argues that we fiction or imagine an idea of self as a continued existence in order to explain the connection we feel between the train of distinct and changing perceptions that exist as a collection/bundle of perceptions that Hume identifies. According to Hume, we ascribe an identity of continued existence, even thought there is no substance or constant perception that we can point to and say, ‘this is my personal identity, this is my self’. In the Appendix of his work, Hume renounces this theory by stating that there are two principles he cannot reconcile: 1) “all our distinct existences perceptions are distinct existences” and (2) “that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences” (App. 21). He then concludes that “we only feel a connexion or a determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another” (App, 20).

Jane McIntyre states that Hume’s initial Theory of Personal Identity is successful in doing to things, it is able to explain the beliefs and and it is able to explain the feelings we have of ourselves (McIntyre, p. 186-7). In Book 1 of the ‘Treatise’, Of the understanding, Hume explains why it is that we tend to believe in an identity of self. In Book 2, Of the passions, Hume explains the feeling of concern we have for ourself. It explains why it is that “a present self who is not, in fact, identical with a self who existed in the past or will exist in the future is nonetheless concerned with a set of past or future pains or pleasures” (McIntyre, p. 191).

In this paper I will use McIntyre’s explanation of belief in Hume’s Theory of Personal Identity in order to present her own interpretation of the skeptical conclusion Hume reaches in the Appendix of his work. I will then focus on feeling as it is represented in ‘The Passions’ in order to further explore this feeling of concern as being the motivation behind the ‘feeling of connection’ that Hume refers to in the Appendix. I will suggest that a feeling of concern for self motivates us to identify our distinct perceptions as connected. Without a concern for the bundle of perceptions that exists as self in Hume’s philosophy, there is no need to identify them as connected thus ruling out the need for the imagination to fiction an idea of self.

Hume’s Theory of Personal Identity Begins in Book 1

In order to talk about Hume’s Theory of Personal Identity, it is necessary to understand the map he has created of the mind for it explains to the reader how ideas are formed and how there can, from this understanding, be no idea of self. In the first paragraph of Book 1, Part 1 Section 1of “A Treatise of Human Nature”, Hume explains the contents of the mind in terms of the perceptions that inhabit it (1.1.1.1). Hume explains that the perceptions of the mind are made of two distinct forms: impressions and ideas. Impressions enter the mind with force and violence (you may want to consider these as immediate experience). Impressions (or immediate experience) are identified by Hume as the feelings, sensations, emotions and passions that “first make their appearance on the soul” (1.1.1.1) Ideas are faint images of these impressions that take shape in the way of thinking and reasoning. Ideas are, for Hume, notions of imagination and memory, actions of the mind that are “excited by the present discourse (impressions), excepting only, those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion” (1.1.1.1.).

There is a lively relationship between the impressions and ideas that make up the contents (perceptions) of our minds and Hume explains this with a notion referred to as the Copy Principle but before I explain this principle (or rather as the principle explains itself), a further distinction of the contents of our minds must be addressed. Hume acknowledges the complexity of some ideas, such that they are composed of many impressions. He identifies the difference between simple impressions and complex impressions (which we will se leads to simple and complex ideas). Simple impressions, perceptions, and ideas, “admit of no distinction nor separation” (1.1.1.2). The complex impressions, perceptions, and ideas, are disassembled into parts. Hume refers to particular instances of colour, taste, and smell as simple impressions that make up the complex idea of apple (1.1.1.2). It is from this distinction between simple impression and the formation of complex ideas that we can begin to see the connection between these two kinds of perceptions. This speaks to the distinction Hume makes within his explanation of perceptions as being a difference between feeling and thinking (1.1.1.1). We feel the sensations of immediate experience of sight, smell, color, taste, and from these simple impressions, think, and form a complex idea of the object apple.

“When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact representations of the impressions I felt; not is there any circumstance of the one, which is not found in the other. In running over my other perceptions, I find still, the same resemblance and representation. Ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other” (1.1.1.3).

The Copy Principle states that “all our simple ideas in their first experience are derived from simple impressions, which are corespondent to them, and which they exactly represent” (1.1.1.6). There is something anti-climatic in this seemingly straight forward explanation of how ideas, and complex ideas formed from their corresponding impressions. What is there is no impression of though, according to Hume, is an impression of self, thus, there are no ideas of self, as complex or simple, in Hume’s initial Theory of Personal Identity.

Hume’s Theory of Personal Identity as Stated in Book 1, Part 4, Section 6

The question Hume immediately poses in this section on personal identity is ‘from what impression could this idea of self be derived?’ (1.4.6.2). He argues that “if any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro’ the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos’d to exist after this manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable” (1.4.6.2). This leads to Hume’s conclusion that there are no impressions and thus no idea of self. Upon further investigation, Hume does find that at any moment of introspection, he is not without any one perception. His observation states that “when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are remov’d for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist” (1.4.6.3). This affirms for Hume his famous conclusion that the self is then a bundle, or collection, of different perceptions that “succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement” (1.4.6.4).

Hume explains that our propensity to ascribe a continued, uninterrupted existence to ourselves as a collection of moving perceptions is grounded in our thought and imagination as well as the concern we take in ourselves, our passions (1.4.6.5). To explain how we can imagine the continuous identity to ourselves, Hume looks to the existence of plants and animals as an analogy to explain how in the absence of a soul or self “our propension to confound identity with relation is so great, that we are apt to imagine something unknown and mysterious, connecting the parts, beside their relation” (1.4.6.6). It is understood, or inferred, that even though our perception of a particular plant of animal is interrupted, that the continued existence of the plant or animal is not. We also tend to ascribe an identity to the continued existences of an object despite our inability to perceive the necessary connections that, presumably, lead to the object’s continued existence. It is the work of the imagination to infer the necessary connections that lead us to ascribe a continued identity to something. As Hume states, this is not unlike the identity we ascribe to ourselves. He states that the “identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. It cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects” (1.4.6.15)

There is a further question Hume poses regarding the identity we ascribe to this bundle of perceptions. He asks “whether it be something that really binds our several perceptions together, or only associates their ideas in imagination?” (1.4.6.16) Following the Unity Principle, that is applied to external objects and how we infer a continuous connection based on our past experience of a things existence, Hume seems to questions personal identity in the same manner. He states that “identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions and uniting them together: but merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them” (1.4.6.16). The identity we attribute to the self, as a continued existence of varying perceptions, is for Hume, a fiction of the imagination, one that allows us to tie together the collection of perceptions that exist in his Theory of Personal Identity. This depends not on the contiguity of perceptions but the resemblance and causation of any “easy transition of ideas” (1.4.6.16-17). Resemblance, via memory, produces relations of resemblance among perceptions and causation allows us to direct “present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures” but he does not admit to what or who is experiencing these perceptions or directing these concerns (1.4.6.19). Causation, on the other hand, explains how our “impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; and these ideas in turn produce other impressions” (1.4.6.19). The topic of resemblance and instances of ‘ideas producing other impressions’ will be further addressed in a section of this paper entitled, “Double Relation; Resemblance and Causation”.

Hume has a difficult time (and he admits this much in the Appendix) determining exactly what personal identity is. He starts out with the argument that there are no impression great enough to form strong ideas of self (leaving us just with perceptions) only to end the conclusion of Book I by stating that identity does however “depend on the relation of ideas; and these produce identity, by means of that easy transition they occasion” (1.4.6.21). There appears a paradox, known to Hume, regarding the issue of personal identity, that he admits this in the Appendix of his work; how does Hume explain our propensity to believe in the continued existence of self as a varying bundle of perceptions when we do not have an understanding of the connections that lead us to believe in the resemblance of distinct perceptions?

Hume’s Appendix

In the Appendix of the work, Hume admits that he has difficulty resolving the issue of how distinct perceptions are connected together if connections (continuous conjunctions) are not known (discoverable) to human understanding. He suggests that we feel a connection, or a “determination of thought” that links one perception to another (App. 20). This feeling, or thought, as Hume states it, is responsible for making connections between the distinct perceptions that we attribute to a persisting self: “thought alone, finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose a mind, the ideas of them are to be felt together, and naturally introduce each other” (App. 20). Hume seems to be attributing a stream of consciousness quality to our idea of self; the idea of a continuous self is derived from the ideas we have of our past perceptions and the feeling that links their existence together. We appear to Hume to have an idea of the continuous stream of perceptions that move like a train through our minds. This is curious given that Hume initially renounces an idea of self based on the lack of impression of self. How does he come to suggest that there is an idea on a continuous self, a unified train of connected perceptions? The problem of reaching this conclusion is due to the introduction of two associative principles that render inconsistent with his new ideas on identity, both of which he can neither renounce nor contest to the consistency: (1) “all our distinct existences perceptions are distinct existences” and (2) “that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences” (App. 21). Without trying to further solve the principles that are “too hard for my understanding”, Hume pleads this case as a skeptic in the hopes that he “upon more reflection, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions” (App. 21). The question is, how do we resolve the skeptical solution Hume presents in the Appendix with the seemingly contradictory relationship of the two associative principles and his initial theory of personal identity?

Hume’s Skeptical Conclusion as Presented in the Appendix

The Appendix of David Hume’s “A Treatise of Human Nature” has perplexed many inspired philosophers to decipher exactly what it is that provoked Hume to question his theories of the necessary relations of causation and resemblance regarding Personal Identity. It is believed by most that Hume reaches this conclusion in paragraph 21 of the Appendix via a realization that there are two associative principles that are inconsistent with his Theory of Personal Identity, both of which he can neither renounce nor contest to their consistency: (1) “all our distinct existences perceptions are distinct existences” and (2) “that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences” (App. 21).

“If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion or a determination of the thought to pass from one object to another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose the mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other” (p. 400).

It is here that Hume seems to return to his Theory of the Existence of External Objects and Events. This theory is most difficult for Hume to explain, in empirical terms, because we don’t actually see the necessary connections between two or more different impressions, yet we infer that there is a relationship so that we are able to reasonably form an idea about the event. According to Hume, it is our custom or habit to do this because we are able to 1. actively think about these relations and 2. trust our memory of past experience of seeing repeated constant conjunctions of cause and effect, despite our inability to see these constant conjunctions.

The Uniformity Principle states “That instances, of which we have had no experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and the course of nature continues always uniformly the same.” ( 1.3.6.4) This principle of Nature allows us to make the jump from belief in the continuous existence of objects and events. We do, according to Hume, infer the continuous connection between events as well as the interrupted existence of objects via the work of the imagination and memory. We can infer the possibility of a continuous connection based on our belief in past experience and our belief in the Natural Order of the world, but we cannot apply this same strategy to identifying, or the very least inferring, an idea of self because there are no impressions of self from which we can infer. This seems problematic at first glance but to suggest otherwise has proven to me a difficult task, as Hume addresses in the Appendix of his work. He returns to this theory by way of ascribing a feeling, something similar to this belief in inference and probability, that perceptions of self are connected to one another and not as distinct from one another as he first suggested.

Jonathan Ellis Categorizes Interpretations of the Appendix

Any discussion surround Hume’s Theory of Personal Identity and the skeptical conclusion he reaches in the Appendix involves numerous interpretations. Before I present Jane McIntyre’s interpretation of the problem Hume admits in the Appendix (and presenting my own thoughts on the work), I think it is important to get a sense of the various ways in which Hume’s Appendix can be read. Jonathan Ellis offer 4 categories by which we can organize the various groups of responses/interpretations of the ‘despair’ Hume seems to express in the Appendix of “The Treatise of Human Understanding.” The groups Ellis has categorized are based, in his opinion, on how 2 sentences of the Appendix are read. In App 20 Hume writes, “But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in out thought or consciousness.” The different groups are determined by the interpretation each takes regarding ‘which perceptions’ and the ‘kind of union’ or connection that Hume is referring to (and has difficulty explaining) in these sentences.

Group 1 is concerned with the ownership of perceptions. Different opinions in this group evolve from the question of unity, and look to explain questions such as “how are ‘my’ perceptions united in ‘my’ bundle, as opposed to all of the other perceptions that exist in the world?” Group 2 argues that Hume’s bundle theory of self (that the self is a bundle of perceptions among which we never perceive any real connection) prevents Hume from being able to explain one or another central tenet or presupposition of his theory of ideas (Ellis, p. 200). Ellis includes Jane McIntyre in this group. As I will explain further, in her article “Hume and the Problem of Personal Identity”, McIntyre states that Hume’s dissatisfaction with the Theory of Personal Identity that he initially proposes in Book 1 is based on his realization that the internal world is not free form the same contradictions of the external world.

The third group Ellis distinguishes claims that the genetic explanation of Personal Identity that Hume advances in T 1.4.6 is faulty, despite and apart form any misgivings or apprehension that Hume or others may express regarding the Appendix of the Treatise. The Genetic Explanation refers to the ‘natural’ way in which Hume explains the idea of self and this is similar to a similar natural or genetic explanation that Hume provides for the idea of distinct and continued existence. Regarding the idea of distinct and continued existence, Hume states that upon reflection, the mind ascribes identity to a series of perceptions that makes up an invariable and uninterrupted object (Ellis, p.197). Hume’s genetic explanation of Personal Identity is similar and states that ‘when we reflect upon a series of perceptions, the transition of the mind from one perception to the next is ‘in feeling’. A problem arises because this ‘identity’ we want to ascribe to our self, is in conflict with the constant variation of our perceptions. To solve this problem, Hume proposes that we invent the idea of a self or soul that connects the perceptions together and ‘disguises the variation’ (Ellis, p. 197). This group follows this argument from the premise that the perceptions in Hume’s Theory of Personal Identity do belong to a particular person and this is the group Ellis aligns himself with.

The fourth group argues that the Personal Identity Theory that Hume concludes with in the Appendix is in conflict/tension with some other aspect of the Treatise, something other than the genetic explanation of self that Hume proposes. Ellis offers 3 varying positions within this group; Norman Kemp Smith explains the indirect passions of Book 2 of the Treatise as the source of conflict, Terrence Penelhum argues that because Hume’s idea of identity is the idea of an object that persists without changing is evidence that attributing personal identity to anything at all is inappropriate. (“Hume on Personal Identity” Philosophical Review). Corliss Swain proposes that T1.4.6 is actually in conflict with T 1.4.5 which states that the “Intellectual world, tho’ involved in infinite obscurities, is not perplex’d with any such contradictions, as those we have discovered in the natural” (Ellis, p. 200). Ellis aligns the second and fourth group together because they are similar; both groups identify a tension between the Appendix and the rest of the text, but what that tension is attributed to differs.

Before considering my own thoughts on the Appendix, I will explain the interpretation held by Jane McIntyre in “Hume and the Problem of Personal Identity”. She argues that the dissatisfaction Hume expresses is found in paragraph 10, in his realization that the internal world falls prey to the same contradiction of the imagination that the external world does. This discussion speaks to the first aspect of Hume’s Theory of Personal Identity that McIntyre identifies, why we tend to believe in an identity of self.

Jane McIntyre Speaks to the Contradictions of the Internal World

In “Hume and the Problem of Personal Identity”, Jane McIntyre offers another interpretation of the dissatisfaction that Hume expresses in the Appendix of “A Treatise of Human Nature”. She argues that the problem Hume faces is stated in the tenth paragraph of the Appendix, which states that the internal world is not free form the same contradictions of the external world. The sentence in question reads as follows:

McIntyre directs us to the first mention of this in the ‘Treatise’, in the section entitled Of the immateriality of the soul where Hume states his initial view that the intellectual world was free from the contradictions the material world faced. She then leads us to the sections Of skepticism with regard to the senses (1.4.2) and Of the modern philosophy (1.4.4). In each of these sections, a contradiction of the imagination is explained in regards to the association of ideas which leads to contradictory results (McIntyre, p. 198). The first side of the contradiction about the material world states that the association of ideas (found in 1.4.2) leads to a belief in the continued and independent existence of objects. The second side of this contradiction, states that reasoning from causes and effects (1.4.4) leads to a conclusion that there are no objects with continued and independent existence (McIntyre, p. 198).

As McIntyre points out, this contradiction that the imagination holds, is definitely a problem of inconsistency that is revisited in the section entitled Of Personal Identity (1.4.6). In this section Hume explains how we tend to believe in the continued existence of a self despite the variation of distinct perceptions that we collect over time. On the one side of the contradiction seen here is a belief in a continued and independent existence of something other than the distinct perceptions. There is a belief, of the imagination, in a self, or soul, or mental substance, that is separate from the perceptions but this is impossible since according to Hume, nothing but perceptions exist; there is no substance that the perceptions adhere to. There is also a second belief of the imagination that Hume holds, the belief that the self is identical over time. This is due to a “tendency of the imagination to associate by resemblance, and to confuse the experience of closely related succession with the experience of an unchanging thing” (McIntyre, p. 199). McIntyre points out these contradictions and concludes that the source of dissatisfaction that Hume expresses in the Appendix is his realization that the intellectual world is not free from the contradiction that trouble him about the material world. As McIntyre states, the fundamental tendencies of the imagination lead to inconsistent conclusion and from this Hume found no acceptable way of resolving our belief in a self that exists throughout time that does not fall prey to this contradiction (McIntyre, p. 200).

The second aspect of Hume’s Theory of Personal Identity that McIntyre identifies is discussed in Book 2 Of the passions; this is the question of feeling and why we have concern for a ‘self’ that consists of a collection of distinct and changing perceptions. Before presenting McIntyre’s explanation of how a feeling of concern for self is possible, I will introduce Book 2 as it is presented by Hume by focusing on the sections that include important notions that will provide context and understanding to McIntyre’s analysis as well as my own thoughts. I will provide brief descriptions concerning the indirect passions of pride and humility and the Double Relation of ideas and impressions.

Of the passions

The concept map of Hume’s interpretation of the mind that he provides in Book 1 of ‘The Treatise’ is elaborated on in Book 2. In Book 1 Hume states that perceptions are made up of impressions and ideas. In the first section of Book 2, Hume elaborates further, stating that impressions are considered to be either original (sensations or pain and pleasure that arise from the body), or secondary (2.1.1.1.). Secondary impressions (passions, emotions, reflections), “proceed from some these original ones, either immediately or by the interposition of its idea” (2.1.1.1). It is important to note the change that Hume admits here. In Book 1 it is stated that ideas must follow from impressions. In Book 2, Hume states that secondary impressions can come from impressions of original impressions or from their ideas (2.1.1.2). This leads to what Hume refers to the Double Relation of ideas and impressions which will be explained in the coming paragraphs of his paper. Secondary or reflective impressions, in Book 2 Of the passions, are further distinguished as either calm or violent. Calm impressions include “the sense of beauty and deformity in action, compositions, and external objects” (2.1.1.3). Violent impressions include, among others, those of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility (2.1.1.3). The violent impressions are distinguished even further into direct or indirect passions. Direct passions arise immediately from good and evil or pain and pleasure. Indirect passions “proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities” (2.1.1.4).

Pride and Humility

The second section of Book 2 is regarding the violent impressions of pride and humility. Hume immediately states that they have the same object and that that object is self (2.1.2.2). As Hume states, the object of self that he is referring to is the “succession of related ideas and impressions”, or bundle of perceptions, that have a memory and a consciousness (2.1.2.3). Without the self, passions like pride and humility have nothing to project to; the self excites the passions, according to Hume but this is not to say that the self, as object, is the cause of these passions (2.1.2.3). This is because, Hume states, one object (self) cannot be the cause of opposite passions and thus the contrary passions of pride and humility must be caused by the productive principle (or the first idea that is presented in the mind) (2.1.2.3). The first idea in the mind “excites the passion, connected with it; and that passion, when excited, turns our view to another idea, which is that of self” (2.1.2.4). Thus, states Hume, the passion is now “betwixt two ideas”, the idea that caused the passion and the idea that is produced by the passion (the object of the passion, the self) (2.1.2.4). Hume also identifies a distinction between the cause of the passion, or the “quality, which operates, and the subject, on which it is placed” (2.1.2.5). This reads as a very mechanical or formulaic way of understanding the passions but it does provide a helpful map to understanding how the passions of pride and humility lead to an understanding of how a ‘feeling of concern for self’ is derived from a sympathy for others and the role memory, intention, and action play in this theory.

Double Relation; Resemblance and Causation

The Double Relation of ideas and impression are explained in Section 4 of Book 2, in a section entitled Of the relations of impressions and ideas. In this section Hume identifies the Three Properties of Nature as being 1. the association of ideas, 2. a like association of impressions and 3. that these two associations assist each other (2.1.4.2-4). The Double Relation of impressions and ideas, explained in the third Property of Nature, explains how they assist each other in transition when they both occur in the same object, the self (2.1.4.4). As Hume states, the Double Relation of impressions and ideas “very much assist and forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same subject” (2.1.4.4). The example Hume uses is that of a man who feels angered by another. Hume states that the passions (fear, impatience) that are created from the initial passion (anger), ‘forward their transition of ideas’ to create one passion of greater violence and force (2.1.4.4). Thus, impressions that are created by another, create in us stronger more forceful impressions that lead to ideas of those impressions, which both occur in the self (of the man). This seems an elaboration of the explanation of impressions and ideas that Hume put forth in Book 1 of the ‘Treatise’, that impressions lead to ideas for now impressions lead to passions and passions are both impressions and ideas. This is the very notion of passions for Hume, that they rely on the Double Relation of both impressions and ideas and that the passions require the self as an object by which the passions are able to express themselves (as both impressions and ideas).

The indirect passions of pride and humiliation, for example, are closely related to a person’s concern for their past and, as McIntyre states, reintroduce the idea of self into the mind, as the object of the passions is the self; the object of the passions is the connected succession of perceptions (McIntyre, p. 192). Hume states that the pleasure caused by something closely related to me is associated with the pleasurable feeling of pride. This is possible because the idea of the cause is associated with the idea of self and thus these two associations reinforce each other by turning the attention toward oneself and generating a feeling of pride (McIntyre, p. 192). This works too in the case of pain and the feeling of humility it creates. The ‘association of impressions’ allows Hume to attribute imagination, memory and feeling as part of the causal relationship that exists in order for the idea of self to exist for as he states:

The relation between impressions and ideas, as it leads back to the first impression or first idea is able to explain our ‘concern with the past as it depends on the relations that exist among perceptions’(McIntyre, p. 193).

This seems to be something similar in what Roderick Chisholm is arguing in “On the Observability of the Self”. In this article he states that the self must be the object of which the predicate is attached to. What Chisholm’s argument does not do is state what that self is, but that is must exist in order for the experience of something to be able to attach itself to something. This does run contrary to Hume contesting that there is no substance, no object of self in Book 1 of the ‘Treatise’ but it is confusing when Hume states in Book 2 that “tis evident that pride and humility, tho directly contrary, have yet the same object. This object is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions which we have an intimate memory or consciousness” (2.1.2.2). Although Hume uses the word object he nonetheless means ‘a succession of related ideas and impressions’. Remembering that Hume does not mean object in a literal sense we can still consider the counterpoint raised in Chisholm’s article, that in order for X to experience something, in this case a feeling of pride, hate, etc, there has to be something to which the experience adheres to or something that exists by which we call X. Contrary to Chisholm, McIntyre reiterates that the self that is maintained in Hume’s theory is a collection of distinct perceptions but Chisholm does raise an important consideration regarding Hume’s theory; how is the self able to experience feelings of a, b, or c if there is no self to experience these feelings?

Of the passions: a Concern for the Future Self

Returning to paragraph 20 of the Appendix which states: “We can only feel a connexion or a determination of thought, to pass from one object to another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other” (App 20).

My intent now it to explore the feeling of associated ideas, that Hume concludes with here, as related to the feeling of concern we have, for our present, past and future self, that Hume expresses in Book 2 of the ‘Treaties’, Of the passions. Returning to McIntyre’s article, I will use her reference to Book 2, where Hume states how intention and action, are instrumental in how concern for self is derived from a feeling of sympathy.

McIntyre argues, as I have already explained, the dissatisfaction Hume expresses in the Appendix is the result of realizing that he cannot explain the continued existence of self without avoiding a contradiction within the operations of the imagination, which leads to his ‘extraordinary’ conclusion that the only connections that exist between perceptions is the feeling of the association of ideas. The feeling we have of the existence of self as a succession of causally related perceptions is not directly explained by Hume and I suggest that it may possibly be related to the concern we have for our future selves. In order to explore this relationship further, we need to understand how Hume explains ‘concern for self’ as sympathy for others and in order to do this, we must first understand the role memory plays in Hume’s philosophy.

Memory

According to Hume, memory plays an active role in the relation of causation, and along with imagination, is responsible for creating the fiction of the self over time (McIntyre, p. 189). McIntyre directs us to early mention of memory in Book 1 of the “Treatise’, in the section Division of the subject (1.1.2) where Hume explains the division of impressions into sensations and reflections. To quote Hume:

“This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflection because [they are] deriv’d from it. These again are copy’d y the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas” (1.1.2.1).

Memory is identified by Hume as one of the causal relations that allow us to link together different perceptions and have an idea of self. This is because the idea we have of self is extended over time, over our entire history, whether we remember it or not (McIntyre, p. 189). McIntyre quotes Hume as saying that “memory does not so much produce as discover personal identity, by showing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions” (1.4.6.20). Memory plays a role in explaining how we tend to believe in the identity of self but what it does not answer is why a present self who is not, in fact, identical with a self who existed in the past or will exist in the future, is nonetheless concerned with a set of ‘past or future pains or pleasures (1.4.6.19) (McIntyre, p. 191). For this, we return to Book 2 Of the passions.

Intention and Action

Hume explains that the relation between intention and action is the explanation for how we are able to think of ourself in the future, by motivating our present self to act with concern for our future self. This can be understood in terms of Free Will in such that Hume states: “Nothing is more fluctuating and inconsistent on many occasions, than the will of man; nor is there any thing but strong motives, which can give us an absolute certainty in pronouncing concerning any of his future actions” (2.1.10.6).

As Hume states there is nothing more fluctuating that the will of a man but there is also nothing more certain than the strong motives one chooses to act from; a strong motive of interest or safety. This explains how our motives and our intention influence how we think of our selves in the future (as based on how we thought of ourselves in the past) (McIntyre, p, 103).

As Hume stated, the indirect passions of pride and humility motivate us to take action, to act in a way that concerns the self and how the impressions of pride and humility are directed towards an idea of self. We are motivated to act towards feelings of pride and away from feelings of humiliation. If we feel a feeling of concern, to avoid or pursue indirect passions, this gives us reason to want to feel a connection between our perceptions, because we care about them. If we react only to the direct passions of pain and pleasure, we have no reason to move away from the body, and towards the feelings that Hume is referring to in ‘The Passions’. The indirect passions direct us to the idea of self as not only the object to which these impressions are directed but also provides reason for the feeling of connected perceptions we believe in. A feeling for concern for self motivates us to believe in the continued existence of self as a unified collection for distinct perceptions. Intention and action can be understood as a way for the self to show concern for its’ future by judging the actions of the past.

We have seen so far that indirect passions (like pride and humility) are explained to operate as a Double Relation of impressions and ideas, and that the passions require the self as an object. The intention and action of free will suggest that our object now has a motive, to act in according to a will that has the interest of safety of the self. McIntyre now explains how the will is inspired to act from a feeling of sympathy (for others).

Concern for Self as Sympathy for Others

Concern for self arises from sympathy for others. McIntyre points to the section Of the mixture of benevolence and anger, etc where Hume says: “Sympathy, being nothing but a lively idea converted into an impression, ‘tis evident, that, in considering the future possible or probable condition of any person, we may enter into it with so vivid a conception as to make it our own concern; and by that means be sensible of pains and pleasures, which neither belong to ourselves, nor at the present instant have any real existence”( 2.2.9.13).

One feature of the passions is that they are expansive and sympathy is an example of this. Sympathy allows us to turn from an idea of the self to an idea of another person and is explained by Hume via the experience of conversation as it allows us to share the feelings of others (2.1.11.2-8). The expression of another person’s feelings and the resemblance it has to our own enlivens the idea, transferring it to the vivacity of our own passions. The passion of sympathy, like the passions of pride and humility, is only possible via the Double Relation of ideas and impressions. This is how it is possible that sympathy, once an idea directed towards the self, created an impression. This play between ideas and impression, contribute to an easy transition of perceptions that we have of our selves. As McIntyre states sympathy is related to the identification of our future self because “the identification of my interest with the interests of a future person - the identification of myself with that person - is the result of the extended operation of sympathy” (McIntyre, p. 195). Sympathy explains how we can concern ourselves with our future self and how this can motivate us to action.

McIntyre states that the passions complete Hume’s account of personal identity because they allow Hume to explain how past perceptions, thoughts, and actions affect my present feelings, providing reason as to why they may be important to me, why I may act out of a concern for my future self, or a future collection of perceptions (McIntyre, p. 191). This is not to say that concern for self is the only feeling that connects and associates the collection of perceptions Hume describes but it may play a role in motivating us to perceive the self as a continued existence. A concern for self may give some insight into the feeling of causally connected or related perceptions that becomes the source of the belief in the continued existence of the self.

There are numerous other possible solutions to the labyrinth of Hume’s appendix that so many have tried to navigate their way through but I am interested in understanding how concern for self is related to sympathy via the resemblance of feelings we can identify in other people and how this causes us to produce an idea of self (as self is the object of the indirect passions). I hope I have explained how the feeling of concern for oneself may play a role in understanding Hume’s Theory of Personal Identity in that the feeling of concern motivates us to believe in the connections that exist among the distinct perceptions that Hume identifies as self for without this concern, there is no reason to identify an idea of self to a body that only experiences pleasure and pain.

In this paper I used McIntyre’s frame of Hume’s Theory of Personal Identity (the explanation of belief and feeling) in order to, not only present her interpretation of the skeptical conclusion Hume reaches in the Appendix of his work, but to also focus on the second part of her framework regarding the passions and our feeling of concern for a future, past, and present self in order to explore this feeling of concern as being the motivation behind the ‘feeling of connection’ that Hume refers to in the Appendix. With reference to Hume’s discussion Of the passions, I hope I have provided some insight into the thought that a feeling of concern for self motivates us to identify our distinct perceptions as connected. Without a concern for the bundle of perceptions that exists as self in Hume’s philosophy, there is no need to identify them as connected thus ruling out the need for the imagination to fiction an idea of self.